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WHY HAVE NO HIGH-LEVEL
EXECUTIVES BEEN PROSECUTED?
Jed S. Rakoff†
Five years have passed since the onset of what is sometimes called the
Great Recession. While the economy has slowly improved, there are still
millions of Americans leading lives of quiet desperation: without jobs,
without resources, without hope.
Who was to blame? Was it simply a result of negligence, of the kind of
inordinate risk-taking commonly called a “bubble,” of an imprudent but
innocent failure to maintain adequate reserves for a rainy day? Or was it the
result, at least in part, of fraudulent practices, of dubious mortgages portrayed
as sound risks and packaged into ever-more-esoteric financial instruments,
the fundamental weaknesses of which were intentionally obscured?
If it was the former—if the recession was due, at worst, to a lack of
caution—then the criminal law has no role to play in the aftermath. For, in
all but a few circumstances (not here relevant), the fierce and fiery weapon
called criminal prosecution is directed at intentional misconduct, and nothing
less. If the Great Recession was in no part the handiwork of intentionally
fraudulent practices by high-level executives, then to prosecute such
executives criminally would be “scapegoating” of the most shallow and
despicable kind.
But if, by contrast, the Great Recession was in material part the product
of intentional fraud, the failure to prosecute those responsible must be
judged one of the more egregious failures of the criminal justice system in
many years. Indeed, it would stand in striking contrast to the increased
success that federal prosecutors have had over the past 50 years or so in
bringing to justice even the highest-level figures who orchestrated
mammoth frauds. Thus, in the 1970’s, in the aftermath of the “junk bond”
bubble that, in many ways, was a precursor of the more recent bubble in
mortgage-backed securities, the progenitors of the fraud were all successfully
†
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prosecuted, right up to Michael Milken. Again, in the 1980’s, the so-called
“savings-and-loan crisis,” which again had some eerie parallels to more
recent events, resulted in the successful criminal prosecution of more than
800 individuals, right up to Charles Keating. And, again, the widespread
accounting frauds of the 1990’s, most vividly represented by Enron and
WorldCom, led directly to the successful prosecution of such previously
respected CEOs as Jeffrey Skilling and Bernie Ebbers.
In striking contrast with these past prosecutions, not a single high-level
executive has been successfully prosecuted in connection with the recent
financial crisis, and given the fact that most of the relevant criminal
provisions are governed by a five-year statute of limitations, it appears
likely that none will be. It may not be too soon, therefore, to ask why.
One possibility, already mentioned, is that no fraud was committed.
This possibility should not be discounted. Every case is different, and I, for
one, have no opinion as to whether criminal fraud was committed in any
given instance.
But the stated opinion of those government entities asked to examine
the financial crisis overall is not that no fraud was committed. Quite the
contrary. For example, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, in its final
report, uses variants of the word “fraud” no fewer than 157 times in
describing what led to the crisis, concluding that there was a “systemic
breakdown,” not just in accountability, but also in ethical behavior. 1 As the
Commission found, the signs of fraud were everywhere to be seen, with the
number of reports of suspected mortgage fraud rising 20-fold between 1998
and 2005 and then doubling again in the next four years. As early as 2004,
FBI Assistant Director Chris Swecker was publicly warning of the
“pervasive problem” of mortgage fraud, driven by the voracious demand
for mortgage-backed securities. 2 Similar warnings, many from within the
financial community, were disregarded, not because they were viewed as
inaccurate, but because, as one high-level banker put it, “A decision was
made that ‘We’re going to have to hold our nose and start buying the
product if we want to stay in business.’”3
Without multiplying examples, the point is that, in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, the prevailing view of many government officials (as well
as others) was that the crisis was in material respects the product of
intentional fraud. In a nutshell, the fraud, they argued, was a simple one.
Subprime mortgages (i.e., mortgages of dubious creditworthiness)
increasingly provided the chief collateral for highly leveraged securities that
were marketed as triple-A (i.e., securities of very low risk). How could this
transformation of a sow’s ear into a silk purse be accomplished unless
someone dissembled along the way?
1
THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
2
Id. at 15.
3
Id. at 111.
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I. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF FRAUD
While officials of the Department of Justice have been more circumspect
in describing the roots of the financial crisis than have the various
commissions of inquiry and other government agencies, I have seen nothing
to indicate their disagreement with the widespread conclusion that fraud at
every level permeated the bubble in mortgage-backed securities. Rather,
their position has been to excuse their failure to prosecute high-level
individuals for fraud in connection with the financial crisis on one or more
of three grounds:
First, they have argued that proving fraudulent intent on the part of the
high-level management of the banks and companies involved has proved
difficult. It is undoubtedly true that the ranks of top management were
several levels removed from those who were putting together the
collateralized debt obligations and other securities offerings that were based
on dubious mortgages; and the people generating the mortgages themselves
were often at other companies and thus even further removed. And I want
to stress again that I have no opinion as to whether any given top executive
had knowledge of the dubious nature of the underlying mortgages, let alone
fraudulent intent.
But what I do find surprising is that the Department of Justice should
view the proving of intent as so difficult in this context. Who, for example,
were generating the so-called “suspicious activity” reports of mortgage
fraud that, as mentioned, increased so hugely in the years leading up to the
crisis? Why, the banks themselves.4 A top level banker, one might argue,
confronted with increasing evidence from his own and other banks that
mortgage fraud was increasing, might have inquired as to why his bank’s
mortgage-based securities continued to receive triple-A ratings? And if,
despite these and other reports of suspicious activity, the executive failed to
make such inquiries, might it be because he did not want to know what such
inquiries would reveal?
This, of course, is what is known in the law as “willful blindness” or
“conscious disregard.” It is a well-established basis on which federal
prosecutors have asked juries to infer intent, including in cases involving
complexities, such as accounting rules, at least as esoteric as those involved
in the events leading up to the financial crisis. And while some federal
courts have occasionally expressed qualifications about the use of the
willful blindness approach to prove intent, the Supreme Court has
consistently approved it. As that Court stated most recently in Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., “The doctrine of willful blindness is well
established in criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a
defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of
willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these
statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical
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facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.” 5 Thus, the
Department’s claim that proving intent in the financial crisis context is
particularly difficult may strike some as doubtful.
Second, and even weaker, the Department of Justice has sometimes
argued that, because the institutions to whom mortgage-backed securities
were sold were themselves sophisticated investors, it might be difficult to
prove reliance. Thus, in defending the failure to prosecute high-level
executives for frauds arising from the sale of mortgage-backed securities,
the then head of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, told PBS
that “in a criminal case … I have to prove not only that you made a false
statement but that you intended to commit a crime, and also that the other
side of the transaction relied on what you were saying. And frankly, in many
of the securitizations and the kinds of transactions we’re talking about, in
reality you had very sophisticated counterparties on both sides. And so even
though one side may have said something was dark blue when really we can
say it was sky blue, the other side of the transaction, the other sophisticated
party, wasn’t relying at all on the description of the color.” 6
Actually, given the fact that these securities were bought and sold at
lightning speed, it is by no means obvious that even a sophisticated
counterparty would have detected the problems with the arcane, convoluted
mortgage-backed derivatives they were being asked to purchase. But there
is a more fundamental problem with the above-quoted statement from the
former head of the Criminal Division, which is that it totally misstates the
law. In actuality, in a criminal fraud case the government is never required
to prove reliance, ever. The reason, of course, is that would give a crooked
seller a license to lie whenever he was dealing with a sophisticated
counterparty. The law, however, says that society is harmed when a seller
purposely lies about a material fact, even if the immediate purchaser does not
rely on that particular fact, because such misrepresentations create problems
for the market as a whole. And surely there never was a situation in which
the sale of dubious mortgage-backed securities created more of a huge problem
for the marketplace, and society as a whole, than in the recent financial crisis.
The third reason the Department has sometimes given for not bringing
these prosecutions is that to do so would itself harm the economy. Thus,
Attorney General Holder himself told Congress that “it does become
difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we
do prosecute—if we do bring a criminal charge—it will have a negative
impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” 7 To a
federal judge, who takes an oath to apply the law equally to rich and to poor,
this excuse—sometimes labeled the “too big to jail” excuse—is disturbing,
5

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
Jason M. Breslow, Lanny Breuer: Financial Fraud has not Gone Unpunished, PBS
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financialcrisis/untouchables/lanny-breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished/.
7
Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder on 'Too Big to Jail', AMERICAN BANKER
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frankly, in what it says about the Department’s apparent disregard for
equality under the law.
In fairness, however, Mr. Holder (who later claimed his comment was
misconstrued) was referring to the prosecution of financial institutions,
rather than their CEOs.8 Moreover, he might have also been influenced, as
his Department unquestionably was, by the adverse reaction to the Arthur
Anderson case, where that accounting firm was forced out of business by a
prosecution that was ultimately reversed on appeal. But if we are talking
about prosecuting individuals, the excuse becomes entirely irrelevant; for
no one that I know of has ever contended that a big financial institution
would collapse if one or more of its high-level executives were prosecuted,
as opposed to the institution itself.
II. POTENTIAL REASONS FOR THE DEARTH OF PROSECUTIONS
Without multiplying examples further, my point is that the Department
of Justice has never taken the position that all the top executives involved
in the events leading up to the financial crisis were innocent, but rather has
offered one or another excuse for not criminally prosecuting them – excuses
that, on inspection, appear unconvincing. So, you might ask, what’s really
going on here? I don’t claim to have any inside information about the real
reasons why no such prosecutions have been brought, but I take the liberty
of offering some speculations, for your consideration or amusement as the
case may be.
At the outset, however, let me say that I totally discount the argument
sometimes made that no such prosecutions have been brought because the
top prosecutors were often people who previously represented the financial
institutions in question and/or were people who expected to be representing
such institutions in the future: the so-called “revolving door.” In my
experience, every federal prosecutor, at every level, is seeking to make a
name for him-or-herself, and the best way to do that is by prosecuting some
high-level person. While companies that are indicted almost always settle,
individual defendants whose careers are at stake will often go to trial. And
if the government wins such a trial, as it usually does, the prosecutor’s
reputation is made. My point is that whatever small influence the “revolving
door” may have in discouraging certain white-collar prosecutions is more than
offset, at least in the case of prosecuting high-level individuals, by the careermaking benefits such prosecutions confer on the successful prosecutor.
So, one asks again, why haven’t we seen such prosecutions growing out
of the financial crisis? I offer, by way of speculation, three influences that I
think, along with others, have had the effect of limiting such prosecutions.
First, the prosecutors had other priorities. Some of these were
completely understandable. For example, prior to 2001, the FBI had more
8
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than 1,000 agents assigned to investigating financial frauds, but after 9/11
many of these agents were shifted to anti-terrorism work. Who can argue
with that? Yet, the result was that, by 2007 or so, there were only 120 agents
reviewing the more than 50,000 reports of mortgage fraud filed by the
banks. It is true that after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, new
agents were hired for some of the vacated spots in fraud detection, but this
is not a form of detection easily learned and recent budget limitations have
only exacerbated the problem.
Of course, while the FBI has substantial responsibility for investigating
mortgage fraud, the FBI is not the primary investigator of fraud in the sale
of mortgage-backed securities; that responsibility lies mostly with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). But at the very time the
financial crisis was breaking, the SEC was trying to deflect criticism from
its failure to detect the Madoff fraud, and this led it to concentrate on other
Ponzi-like schemes that emerged in the wake of the financial crisis, along
with cases involving misallocation of assets (such as stealing funds from a
customer), which are among the easiest cases to prove. Indeed, as Professor
John C. Coffee Jr. of Columbia Law School has repeatedly documented,
Ponzi schemes and misallocation-of-asset cases have been the primary
focus of the SEC since 2009, while cases involving fraud in the sale of
mortgage-backed securities have been much less frequent. More recently,
moreover, the SEC has been hard hit by budget limitations, and this has not
only made it more difficult to assign the kind of manpower the kinds of
frauds we are talking about require, but also has led SEC enforcement to
focus on the smaller, easily resolved cases that will beef up their statistics
when they go to Congress begging for money.
As for the Department of Justice proper, a decision was made in 2009
to spread the investigation of these financial fraud cases among numerous
U.S. Attorney’s Offices, many of which had little or no prior experience in
investigating and prosecuting sophisticated financial frauds. This was in
connection with the President’s creation of a special task force from which
remarkably little has been heard in the intervening four-plus years. At the
same time, the U.S. Attorney’s Office with the greatest expertise in these
kinds of cases, the Southern District of New York, was just embarking on
its prosecution of insider trading cases arising from the Rajaratnam tapes,
which soon proved a gold mine of good cases that absorbed a huge amount
of the attention of the securities fraud unit of that office.
While I want to stress again that I have no inside information, as a
former chief of that unit I would venture to guess that the cases involving
the financial crisis were parceled out to Assistant United States Attorneys
who also had insider trading cases. Which do you think an Assistant would
devote most of her attention to: an insider trading case that was already
nearly ready to go to indictment and that might lead to a high-visibility trial,
or a financial crisis case that was just getting started, would take years to
complete, and had no guarantee of even leading to an indictment? Of course,
she would put her energy into the insider trading case, and if she was lucky,

2014]

HIGH-LEVEL EXECUTIVES

7

it would go to trial, she would win, and she would then take a job with a
large law firm. And in the process, the financial fraud case would get lost
in the shuffle.
In short, a focus on alternative priorities is, I submit, one of the reasons
the financial fraud cases have not been brought, especially cases against
high-level individuals that would take many years, many investigators, and
a great deal of expertise to investigate. But a second, and less salutary,
reason for not bringing such cases is the government’s own involvement in
the underlying circumstances that led to the financial crisis. On the one
hand, the government, writ large, had a hand in creating the conditions that
encouraged the approval of dubious mortgages. Even before the start of the
housing boom, it was the government, in the form of Congress, that repealed
Glass-Steagall, thus allowing certain banks that had previously viewed
mortgages as a source of interest income to become instead deeply involved
in securitizing pools of mortgages in order to obtain the much greater profits
available from trading. It was the government, in the form of both the
executive and the legislature, that encouraged deregulation, thus weakening
the power and oversight not only of the SEC but also of such diverse
banking overseers as the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). It was the government, in the
form of the Fed, that kept interest rates low, in part to encourage mortgages.
It was the government, in the form of the executive, that strongly
encouraged banks to make loans to low-income persons who might have
previously been regarded as too risky to warrant a mortgage. Thus, in the
year 2000, HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo increased to 50 percent the
percentage of low-income mortgages that the government-sponsored
entities known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were required to purchase,
helping to create the conditions that resulted in over half of all mortgages
being subprime at the time the housing market began to collapse in 2007.
And it was the government, pretty much across the board, that acquiesced
in the ever-greater tendency not to require meaningful documentation as a
condition of obtaining a mortgage, often preempting in this regard state
regulations designed to assure greater mortgage quality and a borrower’s
ability to repay. Indeed, in the year 2000, the OTS, having just finished a
successful campaign to preempt state regulation of thrift underwriting,
terminated its own underwriting regulations entirely.
The result of all this were the mortgages that later became known as
“liars’ loans.” They were increasingly risky; but what did the banks care,
since they were making their money from the securitizations; and what did
the government care, since they were helping to boom the economy and
helping voters to realize their dream of owning a home.
Moreover, the government was also deeply enmeshed in the aftermath
of the financial crisis. It was the government that proposed the shotgun
marriages of Bank of America with Merrill Lynch, of JPMorgan with Bear
Stearns, etc. If, in the process, mistakes were made and liabilities not
disclosed, was it not partly the government’s fault? One does not necessarily
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have to adopt the view of Neil Barofsky, former Special Inspector General
in Charge of Oversight of TARP, that regulators made almost no effort to
hold accountable the financial institutions they were bailing out, to wonder
whether the government, having helped create the conditions that led to the
seeming widespread fraud in the mortgage-backed securities market, was
all too ready to forgive its alleged perpetrators.
Please do not misunderstand me. I am not alleging that the government
knowingly participated in any of the fraudulent practices alleged by the
Financial Inquiry Crisis Commission and others. But what I am suggesting
is that the government was deeply involved, from beginning to end, in
helping create the conditions that could lead to such fraud, and that this
would give a prudent prosecutor pause in deciding whether to indict a CEO
who might, with some justice, claim that he was only doing what he fairly
believed the Government wanted him to do.
III. THE SHIFT TO PROSECUTING COMPANIES INSTEAD OF INDIVIDUALS
The final factor I would mention is both the most subtle and the most
systemic of the three, and arguably the most important, and it is the shift that
has occurred over the past 30 years or more from focusing on prosecuting
high-level individuals to focusing on prosecuting companies and other
institutions. It is true that prosecutors have brought criminal charges against
companies for well over a hundred years, but, until relatively recently, such
prosecutions were the exception, and prosecutions of companies without
simultaneous prosecutions of their managerial agents were even rarer. The
reasons were obvious. Companies do not commit crimes; only their agents
do. And while a company might get the benefit of some such crimes,
prosecuting the company would inevitably punish, directly or indirectly, the
many employees and shareholders who were totally innocent. Moreover,
under the law of most U.S. jurisdictions, a company cannot be criminally
liable unless at least one managerial agent has committed the crime in
question; so why not prosecute the agent who actually committed the crime?
In recent decades, however, prosecutors have been increasingly
attracted to prosecuting companies, often even without indicting a single
individual. This shift has often been rationalized as part of an attempt to
transform “corporate cultures,” so as to prevent future such crimes, and, as
a result, it has taken the form of “deferred prosecution agreements” or even
“non-prosecution agreements,” in which the company, under threat of
criminal prosecution, agrees to take various prophylactic measures to
prevent future wrongdoing. Such agreements have become, in the words of
the former head of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, “a
mainstay of white-collar criminal law enforcement,” with the Department
entering into 233 such agreements over the last decade.9 But in practice, I
9
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suggest, this approach has led to some lax and dubious behavior on the part
of prosecutors, with deleterious results.
If you are a prosecutor attempting to discover the individuals
responsible for an apparent financial fraud, you go about your business in
much the same way you go after mobsters or drug kingpins: you start at the
bottom and, over many months or years, slowly work your way up.
Specifically, you start by “flipping” some lower or mid-level participant in
the fraud who you can show was directly responsible for making one or
more false material misrepresentations but who is willing to cooperate, and
maybe even “wear a wire” (i.e., secretly record his colleagues), in order to
reduce his sentence. With his help, and aided by the substantial prison
penalties now available in white collar cases, you go up the ladder.
But if your priority is prosecuting the company, a different scenario
takes place. Early in the investigation, you invite in counsel to the company
and explain to him or her why you suspect fraud. He or she responds by
assuring you that the company wants to cooperate and do the right thing,
and to that end the company has hired a former Assistant U.S. Attorney,
now a partner at a respected law firm, to do an internal investigation. The
company’s counsel asks you to defer your investigation until the company’s
own internal investigation is completed, on the condition that the company
will share its results with you. In order to save time and resources, you
agree. Six months later the company’s counsel returns, with a detailed report
showing that mistakes were made but that the company is now intent on
correcting them. You and the company then agree that the company will
enter into a deferred prosecution agreement that couples some immediate
fines with the imposition of expensive but internal prophylactic measures.
For all practical purposes the case is now over. You are happy because you
believe that you have helped prevent future crimes; the company is happy
because it has avoided a devastating indictment; and perhaps the happiest
of all are the executives, or former executives, who actually committed the
underlying misconduct, for they are left untouched.
I suggest that this is not the best way to proceed. Although it is
supposedly justified in terms of preventing future crimes, I suggest that the
future deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far outweighs
the prophylactic benefits of imposing internal compliance measures that are
often little more than window-dressing. Just going after the company is also
both technically and morally suspect. It is technically suspect because,
under the law, you should not indict or threaten to indict a company unless
you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some managerial agent of the
company committed the alleged crime; and if you can prove that, why not
indict the manager? And from a moral standpoint, punishing a company and
its many innocent employees and shareholders for the crimes committed by
some unprosecuted individuals seems contrary to elementary notions of
moral responsibility.
These criticisms take on special relevance, however, in the instance of
investigations growing out of the financial crisis, because, as noted, the
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Department of Justice’s position, until at least recently, is that going after
the suspect institutions poses too great a risk to the nation’s economic
recovery. So you don’t go after the companies, at least not criminally,
because they are too big to jail; and you don’t go after the individuals,
because that would involve the kind of years-long investigations that you
no longer have the experience or the resources to pursue.
In conclusion, I want to stress again that I have no idea whether the
financial crisis that is still causing so many of us so much pain and
despondency was the product, in whole or in part, of fraudulent misconduct.
But if it was—as various governmental authorities have asserted it was—
then, the failure of the government to bring to justice those responsible for
such colossal fraud bespeaks weaknesses in our prosecutorial system that
need to be addressed.

